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SYSTEMS OF ILLATIVE COMBINATORY LOGIC 
COMPLETE FOR FIRST-ORDER PROPOSITIONAL 
AND PREDICATE CALCULUS 
HENK BARENDREGT, MARTIN BUNDER, AND WIL DEKKERS 
Abstract. Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended 
by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers 
systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first-order propositional and predicate calculus. 
The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the 
propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators or, in a more direct way, in 
which derivations are not translated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. The two direct 
translations turn out to be complete. The paper fulfills the program of Church [1932], [1933] and Curry 
[1930] to base logic on a consistent system of A-terms or combinators. Hitherto this program had failed 
because systems of ICL were either too weak (to provide a sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes 
even inconsistent). 
?1. Introduction. The theory of combinators (Curry et al. [1958], [1972]) and 
the lambda calculus (Church [1941], Barendregt [1984]) are theories that success- 
fully analyze the notion of effective computability. However, the original founders 
of these subjects, Curry and Church, also had aimed to provide a basic for logic 
(and thereby mathematics). Formal systems intended to achieve this are given in 
Church [1932], [1933] and Curry [1930], [1931], [1932], [1933], [1934a], [1934b], 
[1935]. Unfortunately, it was shown in Kleene and Rosser [1935] that these sys- 
tems are inconsistent. In Curry [1942c] the inconsistency of Curry [1934] was 
simplified. This derivation, now known as "Curry's paradox", is akin to the Russell 
paradox but requires no properties of negation. It can be written in only a few lines. 
Curry and his school then started a program of defining several systems of 
illative combinatory logic (ICL) of varying strength, see Curry [1942a]. The goal 
was to "find stronger and stronger systems which are consistent and weaker and 
weaker systems which are inconsistent but strong enough to interpret logic, hoping 
to end up with a consistent system in which logic can be interpreted" (quotation 
from Curry and Feys [1958; ?8S3, p. 276]). 
Following this methodology, Bunder [1969], [1973], [1974] introduced restric- 
tions on the rules of the illative constants so that first-order propositional and 
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predicate calculus can be interpreted in the resulting systems. Bunder [1983a] also 
allows much of set theory. In all these systems the usual derivation of Curry's 
paradox is blocked, but the consistency of these systems remains an open question. 
That the question is not academic was shown in Bunder [1976] and [1983a], where 
related illative systems were proved to be inconsistent. 
In the rest of this section we give a short introduction to illative combinatory 
logic by showing the early inconsistent system of Curry [1934]. In ?2 we introduce 
systems lightly weaker than the ones in Bunder [1973], [1974] but strong enough 
to interpret logic. We derive roughly the following soundness result 
aI FLA A[J] F-c [A], 
where L represents propositional or predicate logic and [-] one of two possible 
translations of each system into an ICL system C (there will then be 4 such C's). 
Of the interpretations one is the propositions-as-types interpretation due to Curry, 
Howard, and de Bruijn; the other is a more direct interpretation. Finally, in ?2 we 
show that the two interpretations are canonically related. 
In ?3 we derive completeness results for 2 of the 4 systems of ICL. These, 
again roughly, take the following form 
[a] f-c [A] * a FLLA. 
This completeness result implies the consistency of the ICL's involved. 
Illative combinatory logic. Now we will present a simple system X of illative 
combinatory logic in order to explain the general idea. The system is strong enough 
to represent he { ,8 V} fragment of first-order intuitionistic predicate calculus. 
The intuition behind the system f is as follows. Terms are type-free lambda 
terms extended by some extra constants. A term X is considered to have an assertive 
value. A term XZ can be seen as a statement saying "Z is of type X" or "Z E X" 
or "Z satisfies the predicate X". The term "AC.X" corresponds to the class {I j X}. 
There is a term E such that the statement 'EXY' is interpreted as "X c Y" or 
"(Vx E X) Yx". Using this z one can define implication and quantification. 
1.1. DEFINITION. The system f is defined as follows. 
(i) T, the set of terms of X9 is given by the following abstract grammar: 
T = VIEITTliV.T. 
Here V is the syntactical category of variables and Z is a constant. We also write 
T = A(s), 
since T is obtained from the set A of type-free lambda terms by adding the con- 
stant Z. 
(ii) On T the usual notion of /hj-reduction is given by the contraction rules 
(Ax.M)N M[x := N], 
Ax.Mx M if x 0 FV(M). 
Here FV(M) is the set of free variables of M. The resulting (more step) flq-reduction 
and /l3-convertibility relation are denoted by and =. Syntactic equality is de- 
noted by _. 
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(iii) A statement of J is just an element of T. A basis is a set of statements. 
(iv) Let F be a basis, and let X be a statement; then X is derivable from F, nota- 
tion F F- X, if F F- X can be produced by the natural deduction system in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
FF-X,X= Y=>FF- Y. 
F - HX1Y, F F- XZ r F YZ, 
F, xx - Yx, x 0 FV(F,X, Y) = F EXY. 
In the last rule x is some variable. The system is based on flq-conversion. Therefore, 
this last rule could be replaced by 
F, X F- Y, x 0 FV(F) =- F F- (x.X)(Ax. Y). 
1.2. DEFINITION. For X, Y E T write 
(i) X :D Y=_ ZE(KX) (K Y) 
(ii) Vu E- X. Y =_ ZEX (Au. Y). 
1.3. PROPOSITION. The following holds for the system X
(i) F F- X , Y, F X => F F- Y. 
(ii) FXF- Y =FFXD Y. 
(iii) F F- Vu E X.Y, F F- Xt => F F- Y= t]. 
(iv) F,Xu F- Y, u FV(FX) =r F -Vu  X.Y. 
Now it is possible to interpret he { D, V} fragment of first-order intuitionistic 
predicate logic into J For example, a sentence like 
Vx(Rx D Rx) 
holding in a universe A is translated as the statement 
(Vx e A.Rx D Rx) 
which is HA(Ax.Z(K(Rx))(K(Rx))) and is provable in J. 
Unfortunately, the interpretation isnot complete (i.e., if the translation of a for- 
mula p is provable in J then p itself is provable in logic) because the system J is 
not consistent; every statement X (i.e., every term) can be derived in J (from the 
empty basis). 
1.4. PROPOSITION (Curry's paradox). Let X be a statement of J Then F-X. 
PROOF. Let X be given. Take 
Y-_ (Ay.(yy) :D X)(Ay.(yy) :D X). 
Then Y = Y D X. Therefore, the following derivation shows that F-X. 
YF Y; 
YF-YDX, sinceY=YDX; 
Y F X, by 1.3(i); 
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H Y D X, by 1.3(ii); 
Y. since Y D X = Y; 
H X, by 1.3(i). 
Note that the derivation of X is related to the proof of the theorem of Lob 
[1955]. 
In the next section the illative system J will be formulated more carefully so 
that the system becomes consistent and in fact complete over ordinary logic. 
?2. Sound interpretations of logics in ICL's. In the introduction we stated that 
logic can be interpreted in two ways in ICL's. In fact, this can be done both for the 
propositional and predicate calculus, so there will be four related illative systems. 
The interpretation will be done for the { } (respectively {I , V}) fragment of in- 
tuitionistic logic. This is the most essential part of logic and the direct interpreta- 
tion ([-] below) can be extended to include the logical operators -, &, v, and 3. 
In second-order logic these operators are definable from D, V, so both our inter- 
pretations can be extended into sound (and probably complete) interpretations of 
second-order logical calculi. 
Now we display the two logical calculi that will be interpreted. 
2.1. DEFINITION. Let PROP be the D fragment of intuitionistic propositional 
logic determined as follows. 
(i) The set of formulas of PROP, notation EPROP, is defined by the following 
abstract syntax: 
FPROP = V I |PROP D FPROP 
Here V is a set of propositional variables. 
(ii) Let F C FPROP and 9 e E PROP. Then F HPROP p is defined by the system of 
natural deduction in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 PROP. 
p E F = F F- p; 
F F-pD t/, F F- => F F-t/; 
F5p F- i/i F F-pD t/. 
2.2. DEFINITION. Let PRED be the { D, V} fragment of first-order many-sorted 
intuitionistic predicate calculus of a given signature s. 
Below as an example, we will treat a version of PRED with s the signature of 
the structure 
<Al, A2, f g9, P, a> 
with 
A1, A2 nonempty sets; 
f: A1 -- A1 a unary function; 
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g: Al -+ A2-+ A, a binary function; 
P c A, a unary relation; 
a E A, a constant. 
(All results also hold for arbitrary signatures.) 
(i) The set of terms of PRED, notation TPRED, is defined by the following ab- 
stract syntax: 
TPRED =TA1 I TA2' 
TA1 = VA1i |a|fTA, IgTAITA2' 
TA2 = VA2. 
(ii) The set of formulas of PRED, notation FPRED, is defined by the following 
abstract syntax: 
FPRED = PTA1 I FPRED EDFPRED I VVAi FPRED. 
(iii) F HPRED p is axiomatised by the system of natural deduction in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 PRED. 
9p E F r F- q; 
F I- pD , F p=> F - ; 
F,(p - => F -(p D ; 
F - VxAi(p, t E TAA F - p x i :t 
F - (p, xAi 0 FV(F) r F VxA(p. 
Now the systems PROP and PRED will be interpreted in ICL's. In order to 
block the proof of the Curry paradox, Bunder [1969], [1973], [1974] modified the 
system X by restricting the s-introduction rule and adding some other axioms and 
a rule. The resulting system Jo was strong enough to provide sound interpretations 
of PROP and PRED, while the proof of the Curry paradox was blocked. However, 
the problems of the completeness of the interpretation and even of the consistency 
of Jo remained open. (The system Jo will be described later.) 
We will give modified versions of Jo in which the logics can be embedded in a 
sound way by two kinds of embeddings. The first kind is "direct", and the second 
kind is according to the "propositions-as-types" and "proofs-as-terms" paradigm, 
see Barendregt [1992; ?5.1, ?5.4]. As there are two logical systems, PROP and 
PRED, there will be four systems of ICL. These systems are called JP, J>, JF, 
and JG respectively. Their use for the two kinds of interpretation is as follows. 
Let [ ]1 be the direct and [ ]2 the propositions-as-types translation. Then Table 4 
(see next page) shows the systems of ICL that are used for the two translations of 
PROP and PRED. 
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TABLE 4 
[]11 []2 
PROP JP JF 
PRED JE JG 
For example 
[]2: PRED -JG. 
The four systems ICL will be described now, and moreover, their relative 
strengths will be compared. 
2.3. DEFINITION. Let T = A(H, L) be the set of type-free lambda terms extended 
by the extra constants H and L. 
(i) Define the following terms in T. 
P Axy.Z(Kx)(Ky), 
F Axyz.Hx(yoz), 
G _Axyz.Ex(Syz), 
H LoK, 
where K Apq.p, M?N -Ax.M(Nx), and S Apqr.pr(qr). 
Write X D Y for PX Y. 
(ii) Define the following four systems of illative combinatory logic fP, fE, fF, 
and fG. All four systems have as rules those given in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 All systems. 
Xc-F =>FI-X; 
F F- X, X =n Y => F Y. 
The four systems have the specific rules given in Tables 6-9. 
TABLE 6 f P. 
Pe F - XDYrFF r-X=F Y; 
Pi FXF YrFF-HX =FK XDY; 
PH FxF HY, F F-HX => F H(X D Y). 
TABLE 7 JE. 
He rF - XYr F XV =r F YV; 
i F,Xx - Yx, F I-LX, x 0 FV(F,X, Y) =r F EXY; 
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TABLE 8 JF. 
Fe TI- FXYZ,FF-XV =>FF Y(ZV); 
Fj F,Xx F- Y(Zx), F F- LX, x 0 FV(F,X, Y,Z) => F FXYZ; 
FL F,Xx F- LY, F- LX, x 0 FV(F,X, Y) => F L(FXY). 
TABLE 9 fG. 
Ge Fl- GXYZ,FF-XV =>F -YV(ZV); 
Gi F, Xx Yx(Zx), F- LX, x 0 FV(F,X, Y,Z) => F F- GXYZ; 
GL F,XXF L(Yx), FF LX, x 0 FV(F,X, Y) = F F-L(GXY). 
To get a taste for what will follow, we give some examples of interpretations of 
tautologies in the ICL's. 
2.4. EXAMPLES. (i) The formula p D p of PROP is translated as p D p in fP. 
The fact that p D p is indeed a wif of PROP is expressed in JP as Hp F H(p D p), 
which should be interpreted as "if p is a proposition, then so is p D p". So H func- 
tions as the class of propositions. It was used in Curry [1942a], Bunder [1969], 
and others to block the derivation of Curry's paradox. Aczel [1980] uses H as in 
Bunder [1969] and in J P. 
The fact that p D p is derivable in PROP is interpreted in J P as Hp F- p D p. 
This should be interpreted as "if p is a proposition, then p D p is derivable". 
(ii) The same formula p D p is translated in f F as Fpp. The fact that p D p is 
a wff of PROP is expressed in fF by Lp F- L(Fpp) which should be interpreted as 
"if p is a type, then Fpp is a type". The type Fpp is intuitively the function space type 
p -* p. The fact that p D p is derivable in PROP is interpreted in JF by making 
the type Fpp "inhabited" by the expression {y.y (formulas-as-types and terms-as- 
derivations interpretation) 
Lp F- Fpp(Xy.y). 
(iii) Similarly, consider the formula VxA(Px D Px) of PRED. Interpreted in fE 
this becomes 
LA, FAHP F- H(ZA(Ax.Px D Px)). 
The intuitive meaning of FAHP is "P is of type A -* H", that is, P is a map from A 
into the propositions and, hence, a predicate on A. (In generalised type systems the 
basis LA, FAHP would be written as the context A: *s, P: A -- *P, see Barendregt 
[1992], especially the systems APRED and AP.) The fact that VxA(Px D Px) is de- 
rivable in PRED becomes 
LA, FAHP F- ZA((Ax.Px D Px), 
which is derivable in JE. 
(iv) The formula VxA(Px z Px) in PRED translated in fG becomes 
LA, FALP F- L(GA(Ax.Px D Px)), 
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which should be interpreted as "if A is a type and P is in A-+ L, then GA(Ax.Px D Px) 
is a type". In the PTS language of AP this is 
A:*,P: A -* F- (Hx:A.Px -Px):*. 
The fact that VxA(Px D Px) is a tautology is interpreted in JG by the inhabitation 
of the type GA(;,x.Px D Px). 
LA, FALP F- GA(Ax.Px D Px)(Ax.Ay.y). 
2.5. Notes. (i) Jo is essentially JE plus the following: 
-EfIH, H-LA1, H-LA2, and F-LH. 
By the axiom "F-LH" one can interpret second-order propositional and predicate 
logic. For example, by rule Hi one gets 
WH (Ap.p '- p) Vp c- H.p -- p). 
So one can quantify over propositions. By "F- IH" one can derive p F- Hp and even 
p H- H(Hp). Here one has a mixture of statements in the language and in the meta- 
language. This gives problems in the study of completeness and maybe it is better 
to skip this axiom "F-E IH", as we have done in the systems JfP, JE, JF, and JG. 
(ii) In the ICL's not only tautologies can be derived but also so-called syntactical 
conditions. For example, in signature s one has f(a) E TA1 and P(f(a)) E EPRED- These 
translate as FA1Alf, A1a F- A1(fa) and FA1Alf, A1a, FA1HP F- H(P(fa)), respectively. 
The following lemma is useful for determining the relative strength of the four 
systems. 
2.6. LEMMA. For all X, Y E T one has the following in A(E, L): 
(i) F(KX)(KY) = K(PXY), 
(ii) GX(Ko Y) = K(hX Y), 
(iii) FX Y = GX(KY). 
PROOF. (i) F(KX)(KY) = Az. 3(KX)((KY)oz) = Az. ?(KX)(KY) = K(PXY), since 
(KY)oz = Ax.KY(zx) = Ax.Y = KY. 
(ii) GX(KoY) = Az. zX(S(KOY)z) = Az. zXY = K("XY), since S(KoY)z = 
Ac.(Ko Y)c(zc) = Ac. Yc = Y. 
(iii) FXY = Az.EdX(Yoz) = AZ."zX(S(KY)z) = GX(KY), since S(KY)z = 
Av.KYv(zv) = AVv.Y(zv) = Y?z. E 
2.7. PROPOSITION. The systems JfP, E, J F, and JfG are related as follows: 
J F -J G 
JP 
where -- denotes nondecreasing strength, i.e., si ) S2 means that for all F, X 
1k~lx --FFS2X- 
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PROOF. We will show that if s1 -_ s2 in the diagram then every rule of s1 can be 
derived in s2. 
(i) Case JP -- . The rules Pe, Pi, and PH follow from respectively H ~ and 
HH by the substitutions of KX for X and KY for Y. 
(ii) Case J P -- J F. Then P, Pi, and PH follow from Fe, Fi, and FL by the sub- 
stitutions of KX for X and KY for Y and Lemma 2.6(i). 
(iii) Case J F -- JG. Now Fe, Fi, and FL follow from G, G., and G. by the 
substitution of KY for Y and Lemma 2.6(iii). 
(iv) Case StE -C JG. Then Ee, J, and EH follow from Ge, Gi, and GL by the 
substitution of Ko Y for Y and Lemma 2.6(ii). C] 
Now we will show formally how the logics PROP and PRED can be interpreted 
in the illative systems. We start with PROP. 
2.8. DEFINITION. Let r be a closed term in A(Z, L). Two maps (for i = 1, 2) 
[rir FPROP 
- 
(="' L) 
and two maps 
F': FPROP ) illative contexts 
are defined by Table 10. (Note that these illative contexts are effectively gram- 
matical conditions on the variables (propositional, individual) that appear in a 
proposition.) 
TABLE 1 0 
9 [9P1' Fri(9) []r r 
p rp H(rp) rp L(rp) 
: D X [Q :D [X]r F F 
) 
(X) F[0*]2[X]2 F 2(o2), F 2(X) 
The r in the above definition and in 2.12 can be replaced by I (i.e., omitted). How- 
ever, in 2.15 we use it to derive a relation between the two interpretations. 
2.9. LEMMA. Let 9 e EPROP and let {Pi , Pn be the set of (free) propositional 
variables in 9. Then 
(i) Fl(9) = {H(rp),. . ., H(rpn)}. 
(ii) F2(9) = {L(rp),... ., L(rPn)}. 
(iii) Hp, HlA FP:p H(p :D 
(iv) 19, Lo CLEF L(F9p,). 
(V) F1((p) FP:p H [()] 1. 
(Vi) 17(9) FLEF L[9] 
2 
PROOF. (i), (ii) follow by induction on the length of 9. 
(iii), (iv) follow by PH and FL. 
(v) follows by (i) and (iii). 
(vi) follows by (ii) and (iv). F] 
2.10. DEFINITION. LetA ' FPROP. 
(i) [P] = {[p]r I e A}. 
(ii) []j2 = {[9]r2X9 | 9 E a} with xp a fresh variable chosen uniquely for 9. 
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(iii) F'(J) = {tr(9) I e E1}. 
(iv) F'(A, 9) = F'(J), T'(9). 
If A is a set of assumptions in a deduction in PROP or PRED, then [a]' is the 
set of translated assumptions. Note that [9]' in a sense represents a class. Each 
[?p]2x, then represents the condition that [9]2 is inhabited, corresponding to the 
fact that 9 is assumed to be true. The Fr(A) are grammatical conditions required 
for the variables of J. 
In the proof of the following proposition there is an unexpected difficulty in 
showing the soundness of modus ponens. The difficulty can be avoided by a trick, 
which however, does not work for PRED as we will see and explain. 
2.11. PROPOSITION (soundness of the interpretations for PROP). Let Jl u {u} c 
GPROP. Then one has the following for all closed r. 
(i) A HPROP 9 => [J]', F (A, 9) KFP [(p]' 
(ii) AJ PROP ND 3M E A[[j], F2(j, 9) 8F [9]2M]. 
PROOF. (i) By induction on the derivation of A KPROP 9 in PROP. 
If p E A, then the result holds by the first rule for K in fP. 
If A F- 9 is a direct consequence of A K / :D9 and A K / then the induction 
hypothesis (IH) implies (leaving out the super- and subscripts) 
[J],F(J, 9) H [p],]D [9], 
[A], F(A, ) H []. 
Therefore, by rule Pe one has [A], F(J,q),F(0) K [q]. If {q q.q} is the 
set of propositional variables occurring in / but not in 9 or A and p is a proposi- 
tional variable occurring in 9, then we have 
[a ], F (A,), H(rq1), . . ., H(rq.) H [p], 
where H(rp) E F(A, 9). Substituting p for each of ql,. . , q., we obtain 
[J], F(, ) K [p]. 
If A 9 is A H- / :DX and is a direct consequence of A, / K X, then by the IH 
one has 
[J], [*], F(At , X) K [x]. 
By Lemma 2.9(v) 
F(0) F- H[f]. 
Hence, we have [A], T(A), F(t), F(X) K [0 : X]. So by the definition of F 
[J], F(), F(o Dx ) K [0/, DX]. 
(ii) Same as for (i) except that for every p E A u {p} in the derivation [p]r will 
have attached a variable xP and every compound proposition a compound term. 
For example, if 9 E A, then [j]2 K [9]2X9 and in the modus ponens case if 
[J], F(J, ,D 9) H7F (F[V] [9])M 
and 
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then 
[J , (J, :: (P) [FIF [](PI N)' O- 
2.12. DEFINITION. (i) AS(E, L) is A(.,, L) extended by the extra constants Al, A2, 
P, f, g, a associated with the signature s of the many-sorted structure of our exam- 
ple. Because we are going to interprete many-sorted predicate logic with sorts 
A1, A2, it is useful to have among the free variables of the A-calculus infinite sets 
'1*', *2, with K = {xi, yi, zi,. . . }. x, y, z denote arbitrary variables. 
(ii) Let r be a closed term in AS(E, L). Two maps (for i = 1, 2) 
[rir FPRED )- As(o, L) 
and a map 
F: FPRED-+ illative contexts 
are defined by Tables 11 and 12. 
TABLE 11 
t [t]r F(t) 
xAj Xi Ajxj 
a a 0 
fs f[s]r F(s) 
gst g [SI ri It] ri F(s), F(t) 
TABLE 12 
_____i___ []F r 
Pt r(P[t] 1) r(P[t]j2) F(t) 
VlD I X [XJr GAF [t/]2[X] 2 F(f) F(X) 
,VXAj; E"Ai(Axi *[*]r ) GAi(Axi * 2*r) F(ll) - {Aixi 
(iii) 
r's= <LA1, LA2, FAlAlf, FA1(FA2A,)g, FAH(roP), Ala>, 
r = KLA1,LA2, FA1Alf,FA1(FA2A,)g, FAlL(roP), Ala>, 
and 
= r, u {A2x2} where x2 E '2 is some variable. 
The definitions F' and F',+ of course refer to our example of a many-sorted 
predicate calculus with signature s. 
It is essential to add A2x2 to F's (and if required, similarly, for other sorts) to 
avoid the problem of possibly empty domains. It would be natural that 
K PRED 9 F [J] 1, F(z, 9() 7 [p] 1 
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However, this is not true. The similar problem for PTS's (see Barendregt [1992]) 
was first noted by E. Barendsen [1989]. The point is that in ordinary (minimal, 
intuitionistic, orclassical) logic it is always assumed that the universes A1, A2,... of 
the structure are supposed to be nonempty. For example, 
(VxA(Px -* Q)) -* (Vx Px) -+ Q 
is provable in PRED, but only valid in structures with A #A 0. In so-called free 
logic one also allows structures with empty domains. This logic has been axiom- 
atised by Peremans [1949] and Mostowski [1951]. What is unexpected is that the 
problem turns up in the case of modus ponens (cf. the proof of Proposition 2.14). 
2.13. LEMMA. Let 9 e EPRED. 
(i) If t E TAj, then in SE or JG one has F(t), Fs F- Aj[t]'. 
(ii) F s, F(() Pf H [p] r. 
(iii) rs,S F((p) FLGL[p]r 
2 
PROOF. (i) By induction on the length of t, using the statements A1a, FAlAlf, 
and FA1(FA2A,)g in Frs. 
(ii) If 9=Pt where t E TA1, then by Fs F- FAH(roP), (i), and F(9) = F(t) 
we have F F(9) ( f_ H(r(P[t])) as required. The remaining cases are as in 
Lemma 2.9(v). 
(iii) As in (ii) and Lemma 2.9(vi). E 
2.14. PROPOSITION (soundness of the interpretations for PRED). Let JU{9} c 
FPRED; then the following hold for all closed r. 
(i) APRED (P =s Fl, [A-]r, F(z, 9) 1-; [(p]r 
(ii) A FPRED 9 => [1]2 r, F(J, p) LG [9]r2M for some M. 
PROOF. (i) The induction on the proof of A1 FPRED 9 is as in the proof of 
Proposition 2.11(i). When, in the case of modus ponens, terms A1xl for vari- 
ables x1 E FV(/) - FV(9) need to be removed from the left of the F- we replace x1 
by a. If terms A2xi for xi E FV(f) - FV(9), we replace xi by x2 and note that 
A2X2 Ec Fl,- 
(ii) The induction on the proof of A HPRED 9 is as in the proof of Proposi- 
tion 2.11(ii) with G[I](Ax.[9]) instead of F[i][p]. Variables may need to be 
replaced as in (i). 
2.15. PROPOSITION (the relation between the two interpretations). (i) For Np E 
FPROP one has K[9] 1 = [9] 2 
(ii) For (p E PRED one has K[p]l = [p]2r 
PROOF. (i) By induction on the length of 9. 
K[p]lJ = K(rp) = [P]i2r, 
K[p :D +] = K([p]l D [D ) = F(K[(p]1)(K[i]r), 
by Lemma 2.6(i), so by the IH 
K[(p D -] = F([(p]2r)([]r) = [9 D ]2 
(ii) By induction on the length of 9 as in (i) but also using Lemma 2.6(ii). LI 
?3. Completeness of two of the interpretations. In this section we derive com- 
pleteness for the interpretations [ ]1: PROP-*f P and [ ]1: PREDATE We con- 
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jecture completeness for the interpretations [ 12: PROP -4 fF and [ 12: PRED 
JG, but we have not been able to prove it.' 
We start with the proof of the completeness for YE relative to PRED. This 
occupies subsections 3.1-3.11. The proof for J P relative to PROP in 3.12-3.14 
proceeds in a similar way but is much easier. 
Completeness for J.' relative to PRED. We will show 
Vr [F 1 +, [J]', F(,A, ?) F [9]'] a: J HPRED g 
Here the signature s and the context Flr+ are as in 2.2 and 2.12; again the result 
can easily be generalised to other signatures. 
It is sufficient to show 
rr1"S+1 ', 9 [af r91rk : F' -aPRED ND 
for a special r. We choose r =1, i.e., we omit r and we prove 
rl + [X ] 1ra (P) Ad[(PI 'A a PRED 9, 
where the definitions of F,' + and [-]' are obtained from 2.12 by everywhere 
omitting r. 
The proof goes in two steps. First we define a grammar in order to analyze the 
terms M such that Fs +, [A]', F(A, 9) Vy M. Then the completeness is shown by 
means of this analysis. Instead of Hu we shall mostly write F-. 
3.1. REMARK. That it is not obvious that completeness holds is because not only 
translations of tautologies can be derived in the ICL's, but also syntactical state- 
ments. Let = F1 + [A F(A , 9). Then we can derive in J' sequents of the form 
F H [9], 
where [9] is (the translation of) a logical formula, but also 
F F- H(Pt), 
where H(Pt) corresponds to the syntactical statement Pt e FPRED in the meta- 
language. In 
F F- LAi 
LAX corresponds to the fact that Ai is one of the sets in the signature s. Even a 
mixture is possible 
Hp F- p 22 Hp. 
Using the grammar it will be shown that such mixed statements do not interfere 
with the logic. The translations of logical formulas will form a class Y (propositions) 
in our grammar and the other statements a class S (grammatical conditions). 
'After the paper had been sent to the journal we succeeded in proving completeness for [ ]2: PROP 
J F, but completeness for [ ]2: PRED -* JG is still open. 
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3.2. DEFINITION (grammar for derivable statements in SE). 
9 =91 1i2, 
X- = V1 I a If9_ I g9_i2 , 
A2 = (,x2) 
g = PLA1 IFAJAxi.) I -(K)(K,),(K 
S = L~Ai I Ei Ai(Axi.fl I 'F(K9)(K?) I L(K), 
(9 = W 1Y 
g = {MI]3N eIN =811M}, 
g = {M 3N E N IN = M}, 
W = {MI3NeEIN=oI M}, 
(9 =GUS~. 
3.3. REMARKS. (i) All elements of (9 are in fht-normal form if we read KM as 
2y.M. So all elements of (9 have a (unique) fht-normal form. 
(ii) BP and C do not exhaust the possible theorems of X2, e.g., 
H(Hp) F- H(Hp D p), Hp, H(Hp) F- H(p D Hp). 
3.4. NOTATION. Let M E (9 with normal form N, and let u be a variable. Then we 
write u 0,, FV(M) for u 0 FV(N). 
Now in 3.5-3.10 we state some technical results that are needed in the complete- 
ness proof. The main proposition is 3.10, stating that only terms in (9 can be derived 
from F1 +; this gives the required analysis. 
3.5. LEMMA. (i) Let "I" = 92, Y, , or (9. Then 
w EYl ti E g, xi e 'Vi =E w[xl := tl,x2 := t2] E YI 
(ii) Let Y = , 2 2 or (9. Then 
we CY1 tj Y , x' e G'' => w[x := tl, x2 := t2] E Y 
PROOF. (i) By a simple induction. 
(ii) From (i) and 
M1 =0 7M2, N1 = fln N2 = Ml[x := N1] =fl,, M2[x:= N2]. 
3.6. LEMMA. Let cXl . . X, = fl1 M for some M E (9 and some constant c. Then 
n E {1,2} and M _ cYl ... With x =pl Xi. 
PROOF. By Church-Rosser and the fact that all elements of (9 are in fB-normal 
form. Li 
3.7. LEMMA. (i) Fl"' = W. 
(ii) C P=0. 
(iii) C =0. 
PROOF. (i) FA1Alf = hA1(Axl.Al(fxj)) E C because A1(fxl) E K Moreover, 
FA1(FA2A,)g = EAl(Axl.EA2(Ax2.Al(gxlX2))) E W. 
Finally, FA1HP = EA1(Axl.H(Pxl)) E C because H(Px1) E W. 
(ii) By an easy induction. 
(iii) From (ii) by Church-Rosser and the fact that the elements of (9 = W u B are 
in &f1-normal form. L1 
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3.8. LEMMA. (i) [-1': PRED -+ AS(d, L) induces bijections 
[]1: TA, 9-, 
[]1: TA2 +2 
[]1: FPRED K R 
(ii) If (p E FPRED, then [p1' e Y and F(p) c t. 
(iii) If A c EPRED and e EPRED, then Fr' u [zE]' u F(,) C ( 
PROOF. (i) and (ii) by easy inductions. 
(iii) from (ii) and 3.7(i). D 
3.9. LEMMA. If (p e FPRED, X A e VAi , tAi e TA*, Xi x1 e, then 
[?] Xi [tA] ]- [?XAI = tAi]]1. 
PROOF. By an easy induction. O 
3. 10. PROPOSITION. 
F F- M, rF (9 = M e (9. 
PROOF. We use induction loading and show 
(*) F - MrF &u p FV(F) = .Me&&u p FV(M) 
by induction on the derivation of F F- M. We only consider the three i-rules; the 
other two rules are easy. 
Case e. F F- M is F F- YV as a direct consequence of F F- EXY, F F- XV. 
By the IH one has EXY e (9, u 0pQ FV(2XY) & XV e (9, u Of, FV(XV). We dis- 
tinguish two cases according to the form of 2X Y, using Lemma 3.6. 
Subcase Ee(a). X = Ai, Y = ,xi.O with 0 e (9. Now AiVe (9 & u Of, FV(AiV). 
So V = t, where ti e 9 and u ? FV(t1). Hence, by Lemma 3.5(i) 
M = (Axi.O)ti = O[xi:= tl] e (9 
and 
u Ofl, FV(O Exi := til)5 
because u 0 FV(Axi.O) u FV(ti). 
Subcase e(b). X = Kp, Y = KO, with p e AP, 0 e (9. Now YV = 0, where 
u 0 FV(O). 
Case Ej. F F- M is F F- EXY as direct consequence of F F- LX, F, Xx F- Yx 
with x 0 FV(Fr X, Y). 
By the IH one has LX e (9 and u 0,, FV(LX). We distinguish two cases accord- 
ing to the form of X. 
Subcase Ed(a). X = Ai. Now x is any variable, so we may assume that x e *, 
u # x. Then Aix e (9 and u 0 FV(Aix); hence, by the IH one has 
Yx e (9 and u 011 FV(Yx). 
Let Yx = 0 e (9. Then M = EAi(Ax.O), where u 0pQ FV(Ax.O). 
Subcase Ed(b). X = Kp. Then F, p F- Yx. One has x 0 FV(F, p), u f, FV(F, p) 
because u l,, FV(LX). So by the IH one has 
Yx = 0 e (9, where x 0 FV(O), u 0 FV(O). 
Hence, Y = KO and M = E(Kp)(KO), where u 0 FV(pO). 
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Case H F r-- M is F F- H(EXY) as a direct consequence of F F- LX, 
,XXx F- H(Yx) with x 0 FV(FX, Y). 
The proof is similar to the proof for case E1. We now get H(Yx) e (; hence, 
Yx e Y and 
M = H(EAj(Axl.p)) with u 0 FV(Axi.p) in case 'H(a), 
M = H(Z(Kp,)(Kp2)) with u 0 FV(plp2) in case ,H(b). O 
3.11. PROPOSITION (completeness for fE relative to PRED). 
FS" +5 EJ 5 F(,A 5P) Et [] '> Id FPRED (- 
PROOF. Fr'+ c W by Lemma 3.7(i) and F(J, p) c W by Lemma 3.8(ii). Hence, it 
is sufficient toprove 
(**) Jg, [J] F- M, Fg = , M = E(p] - A SPRED 
Write F = Fg, [E]'. Then F c (9; hence, M e (9 by Proposition 3.10. The proof of 
(**) goes by induction. 
Case 1. F F- M because M e F. 
M = [p1l' e- by Lemma 3.8(i), so as Y c Y and Y n = 0 M [A]'. As 
the elements of [A]1 are in nf as are those of Y, one has [p 1 e [A]' and by 
Lemma 3.8(i) cp e A. Hence, A F-PRED P- 
Case 2. F F- M is a direct consequence of F F- N and M = N. 
Now N = M = [(p]' and by the IH for N one has z F-PRED p. 
Case Ee. F F- M is F F- YV as a direct consequence of F F- X Y. F F- XV. 
As EXY e (9 by Proposition 3.10, we need consider only 4 cases. 
Subcase Se(a). X = Ai, Y = Ax1.p. Now F F- AiV e (9 by Proposition 3.10. There- 
fore, V = t, = [tA,]'. Since p c Y, we can write p = [/] 1 by 3.8(i). Therefore, [cp] = 
YV = (iAxi-p)EtAiX = [iJ[xi [tAN]'] = [EO[xi= tAl].1 So 
[?] _[[XAj := t i]]l. [~p]' 1 = ExO 
Hence, p- f[xAi := tAj]. EXY = EAi(Axi.p) = [VxAif]1. By the IH one has 
'A F-PRED VXVi. So zl F-PRED V[XAi = tAj] p. 
Subcase Se(b). X = Kp,, Y = Kp2. Then [p] = M = YV = P2 e- Y, and by 
3.8(i), we can write p, = [pi]l. Therefore, EXY = E(Kpl)(Kp2) = [P1 D op]1. By 
the IH one has 
F-PRED 1 D p- 
Also, XV = p, = [cpl]', so by the IH one has 
'A FPRED 1- 
Therefore, it follows by modus ponens that 
F-PRED - 
Subcase Ee(c). X = Ai Y = AXx.g. Since F Ai V e (9, one has V e 4. There- 
fore, M = YV = g[x := V] e W. So M = [cp]' for all p by Lemma 3.7(iii). 
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Contradiction. 
Subcase Ee(d). X = Kp, Y = Kg. Now M = YV = g, so M + [p1l' for all p. 
Contradiction. 
Case E;. F F- M is F F- EXY as a direct consequence of F F- LX, F,Xx F- Yx 
with x 0 FV(F, X, Y). 
As 2X Y = [Ep1' E b we need consider only 2 cases. 
Subcase Ei(a). X = Ai, Y = Xx1.p. Let p = [M/'. Then M = [vxAi"]l. Now x is 
any variable, so we may assume x E A-. Then Xx = Aix E C. 
As F, Xx F- Yx one has F, Xx F- Efr'. So A F-PRED ' by the IH. Now x does not 
occur in F, so 
A FPRED VXVi*. 
Subcase Ej(b). X = Kp,, Y = Kp2. Let Pi = [EP]1' P2 = [P2]1- Then M= 
[ ' fl1. Now F,Xx F- Yx is Frp F- P2* So by the IH one has zcp F-PRED P2 
Hence, 
A FPRED P D (P2 
Case H. F F- M is F F- H(EXY) as a direct consequence of F F- LX, 
F,Xx F- H(Yx) with x 0 FV(FrX Y). 
This case is not applicable because M s b'0. D 
Completeness for f P relative to PROP. The proof of this completeness follows 
the same pattern as the proof of the completeness for fE relative to PRED, but it 
is easier. As in that proof it is sufficient to take r = 1, i.e., we omit r. 
3.12. DEFINITION (grammar for derivable statements for UfP). 
Y = Ha|-,D 
Be 9, and (9 are then defined as in Definition 3.2. 
3.13. PROPOSITION. 
F Fop M, F c 6( = M E (9. 
PROOF. By induction on the derivation of F ke p M. The various cases corre- 
spond to the two initial cases and cases e(b), F(b), and HH(b) of the proof of 
Proposition 3.10. D 
3.14. PROPOSITION (completeness for f P relative to PROP). 
EJ 1 l F (,A5P) ha,,Ep] [?1 ==>,A FPROP P- 
PROOF. This consists of the initial cases and cases Ee(b), Ee(d), Ej(b) of the 
proof of Proposition 3.11 and the H case with Kpj for X and Kp2 for Y. As be- 
fore [-]' is 1-1 and Con = 0 andif Xe (9 then F'(X) cz. W 
?4. Remarks and open problems. 
4.1. REMARKS. (i) The systems JP, >Z. F, and JG are based on 
conversion. It is possible to work with variants of these systems based on /3- 
conversion only. Change the rules for iE as in Table 13 (see next page) and similarly 
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for f P, f F, and fG. Then in the proof of the completeness for fE relative to 
PRED only minor changes need to be made, like replacing Ai, X, Xx, and 13i by 
Axi.Aixi, Ax.X, X, and /3, respectively. 
TABLE 13 JE. 
X E- .=FF- X; 
F l- X, X= => FFY; 
e F - F (Ax.X)(Ax.Y), F F- (Ax.X)V =r F (Ax.Y)V; 
FHX FY, F F- L(Ax.X), x 0 FV(F) =r F F(Ax.X)(Ax.Y); 
H FX HY, F F- L(Ax.X), x 0 FV(F) =r F H(x(Ax.X)(Ax. Y)). 
Similar changes should be made in the proof of the completeness for J P rela- 
tive to PROP. The reader is invited to verify all details. 
(ii) The additional primitive L added to A(2) was not strictly necessary. We 
could have used the definition L = WE and simplified our grammar for derivable 
statements in JE in Definition 3.2 in the following way: 
B = Pg1 |Ai(Axi.Y) |(KY)(KY)5 
W = AiXj | Ai(Axi.W) | (KYP)(KW). 
Note that now L(KY?) = E(KYP)(KYP), so L(KY?) shifts from W to B! Similarly for 
JP, H can be defined as WP as was done in Curry [1942a]. 
(iii) In the work of Seldin and others L is defined as FEH, where E is a univer- 
sal class. Under this definition Hp and L(Kp) are interderivable, but our proof of 
Proposition 3.10 fails. 
(iv) The title of the paper refers to combinatory logic, but the systems used are 
based on lambda calculus throughout. The illative systems could have been based 
on combinatory logic using an appropriate bracket abstraction algorithm. 
(v) For historical and other remarks concerning the combinators 2, P, F, and 
G, see Hindley and Seldin [1986; Chapter 17 for 2 and P, Chapter 13 and Chap- 
ter 15 for F, and Chapter 16 ??C, D for G]. 
4.2. Open problems. The following is a list of open problems. 
(i) Is the interpretation []2: PROP -+ J F complete? Is the interpretation 
[ ]2: PRED -+ JG complete? 
(ii) Is JF a conservative xtension of J P and JG a conservative xtension 
of fE? 
(iii) Adding as axiom LH to JZ one can interpret second-order propositional 
and predicate logic. Is this interpretation complete? 
(iv) Is the extension X0 of JE in 2.5 complete? Are similar extensions of J F 
and JG complete? 
4.3. REMARK. The system X0 is consistent. This can be seen in the following 
way. Let 
i = V I LAi I LH I IH I ZAi(Ay.9) I EH(Ay.9) I E(K9)(K9) I Ai I Ht. 
C= {MI3N I N =#,,M}. 
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Then one can prove 
F F- M, F C => M E W. 
So if F-M, then M has a normal form. Hence, the system is consistent, because 
Q -((Ax.xx)(Ax.xx) cannot be derived. This weak consistency result was proved 
by a similar method in Bunder [1983b]. 
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